There are three views we can have of a contest with our internal security agencies : As spy-vs-spy we are distributed and open intelligence against their bureaucratic, paranoid and porous system. As surveillance state against citizens and government against militias, they are on the wrong side of the signal / noise problem.
All cases have them on the losing side, analysis of the open source intelligence case is done by professionals. All cases have the government on the wrong side of the ingenuity game, we have the initiative, we are motivated, and there are many more of us. This discusses their fatal weakness arising in their signal / noise problem, and how our strengths can use that against them.
Overview : We can destroy the confidence of civilian superiors, citizens, other security agencies, and our American Gestapo’s own confidence in themselves, do it entirely in the open, never break a law, and have a blast of a game doing it.
The problem our various intelligence services have is that they are trying to extract signal* amplified by paranoia from channels where patriots can easily control the noise, noise which we can make as much like any signal as we wish, or random, or anything in between. They have to figure out what is what and its meaning, ultimately a job for people. We can control the information they can extract from their work and thus their paranoia level. We can control their work load, their success rates, the brilliance of their insights, and we can all of us remain strictly within the law at all times. We can build our organizations, meet new people, have a lot of fun all while destroying our intelligence services**, never a shot fired, with all communications seen and many interpreted by our government.
In facing opposition from a significant minority of citizens, governments are at a numerical disadvantage. Also, in countries with many guns, at a power disadvantage.
Government’s large advantages are initiative and coordination of their power, so citizens and groups of citizens are at a relative disadvantage in interactions chosen by the government. They require good intelligence in order to apply their power in ways that enhance or prolong their reigns.
Our government’s problem is understanding who has intent to oppose them, what they want to do and when. That is the signal. At any time, the number of people with intent to oppose is low. Very likely the NSA has a good understanding of how many, including lists of people who are in active training, etc. Anyone associated with that community should assume that NSA knows all, you will be safer.
So at this point, our gov thinks they have the situation covered, they know who is who, who is connected to who, and most of the spark plugs on our side.
But we less-than-activists can obscure that knowledge, and make them very uncertain about everything they think they know. We do that by playing “let’s pretend” with a couple of burner phones, a tor link, logins in anonymous machines, some code writers, some insider knowledge, and inspiration acquired over a beer or bong.
Security’s problem is that their detectors HAVE TO BE set x% lower than our noise-generators, because otherwise, how can they claim to know what is going on? So we control the amount of noise they must listen to and when they listen to it. If we want to schedule overtime for them New Year’s Eve, all it requires is some scripts on a computer somewhere generating some codes and some dummy documents and starting what looks like a standard encrypted email cascade through the ‘active planning extremists’, as we hope to become known.
NSA automates a lot of traffic analysis, code-breaking, and other low-level intelligence tasks, but ultimately someone has to look at everything that passes the automated checks, and those have to be set N% low, cover-your-ass low, because intelligence analysts just can’t let anything get by them.
Our noise can control their individual incentives : “oh god, not another hot connection, they never turn out, waste of time’. But they can’t ignore them, because that is their job.
An innovative group can create an amazing stream of almost-real intelligence, enough to saturate any team of intelligence analysts our government can recruit. Real planners, or at least planners with the power to execute the plans, can send everything mixed into the stream, the Gestapo has to figure out what is what.
Some first ideas, patriot gamers will have many more and many better :
Join the Patriot Ops Planner Game. You get yourself a burner phone and a pseudonym. Find someone you personally know and trust to become a patriot gamer with you. Use psudonyms. Maintain good security. Eventually, the 2 of you find a way to connect to a 3rd, etc. Use the phones for text messages only, enticing but cryptic. Swap phones randomly often with people in other groups. Randomly-often, use your old burner phone, the one you haven’t turned on in months rather than the new one. NSA will have a few problems with that pattern of links in their traffic analysis. Phones disappear and reappear, connections between phones are pretty random. Soon every phone has been connected with every other phone by only a couple of steps, just like the internet, many have migrated all over the US. At that point we have a burner-phone network and they know bupkis about anyone on it. We know our local group, someone in our group can talk to someone in that group to get another number, etc. We can even make that pattern random, tho it is a weak spot. Strong encryption for phone lists. Send a lot of random number files made to look like phone lists, etc. (Added a week later: I have a much better approach. Soon, I hope.)
Try hard to keep connections trusted people. Given all of the federal, state and local informants, you will fail, probably, but try. Traffic analysis gives NSA something to do, makes good signal-like noise to cover the real stuff going on. It makes politicians nervous. It expands intelligence budgets, but gives them nada for their efforts.
Set up a tor link with an exit node. Tor isn’t perfect, but NSA’s problem scales by at least the number of tor exit nodes. So everyone contributes a bit of bandwidth and an exit node, we collectively overwhelm NSA.
We should start a patriot-mania for home-grown encryption, programs modified and passed hand-to-hand as authentication for the group. NSA will break those also if they are used much. But not automatically. Some human cryptographer will get involved, eventually. Someone has to program the decryption machines. And meanwhile, dumb patriots that we are, NSA sees some of our stuff. But not all. Is that block of data random or a really good encryption system? Or maybe one of the older, or a newer, version of this flawed cypher system? Or maybe a couple of flawed, amateur cryptos wrapped? And after solving all the puzzles, they are faced with the question “Is someone funnin’ us?”
Use a BS Generator for ‘top secret documents from gov files’. These collect the word-use statistics for sets of documents you provide. It can then create documents using words statistically. Meaning is weird, if present, but it takes a human to look at that and know for sure. After all, it was generated with the other side of any automated analysis program our opposition has. In fact, it has to be looser than ours to be certain that its detector catches anything better than our generator. Read that link, a BS Generator is an anti-intelligence tool of the highest order. You can generate documents just like some General’s memos if you have a set. Wikileaks may have those.
Include a lot of photos of interesting installations, but strange points of view, lousy focus and lighting, … make them work to identify it and puzzle about why you are sending that.
The goal is to flood our Gestapo with lots and lots of new and different and real different and wtf? Some half-assed security precaution by buddies too drunk to find their keys will combine with something else to make for a problem in the Gestapo’s processing. We want to make a lot of these problems, a flood of them. Find strange lists of sayings, and use those as an indirect code. Modify the list and pass them around. Keeping the genology straight will be another task for the Gestapo, the kind of thing they can’t resist.
Encrypt everything, of course, seriously. That is, good enough to make cracking hard, but not impossible. Super-encrypt, encrypt the encrypted file, with your encryption and key. They have have already gotten the file, but make them work to dig all info out of the encryption.
To keep the Gestapo busy, it is best that security is not perfect, just that there are a lot of security measures, that they change all the time, and that they get wrapped. We want to write invites to BBQs with as many key militia and planning and coming mayhem terms as we can, good fun with double meanings. Encrypt and send everywhere via tor. Lots of genuine patriots will get that and every other kind of person too. Include Jihadis, Russian nationals, Chinese intelligence services, … But the Gestapo won’t know that you don’t know any of those people, we raise their paranoia level and make a lot more work for them.
So ssh to a private server and tor node via tor. Do it from a coffee shop while booting from a Tails CD. Did you know a program can send text messages to any phone # or email files or forward emails or … There are a million security tricks to be invented to use against a surveillance state. We can make patriots look like anything, overload their system in any way that seems profitable. In fact, we will eventually affect the stock market, can make $ with prior knowledge. That will hurt them where they live.
People should start coordinating wearing some identifiable item for a few weeks. Change groups at random. Switch telephones as they do so. Still talk to the old group, but often in presence of new.
Get the kids on this. Good training for all citizens and the family that generates noise together always has something to talk about.
When we are good at this, our contest will be for the first local group to entice the local cops into watching us and then catching them. Can you imagine the scene as they approach our young lovely seemingly taking pictures of an inebriated girl friend just as a cop across the street walks in our out of the bar and is included in every frame? Every other person in the restaurant starts videoing the encounter and shouting “We win!”.
Or consider the panic that will be produced by an active planning group’s burner phones being turned on in a hidden location a week before some significant date, sending and receiving a few txt codes with a few outside-the-group phones, then going back off. Surely there is a major operation in the offing.
It is time to start showing some determined opposition to these bastards. Lets make this game big soon and ruin their holidays because of the huge increase in patriot’s planning traffic.
*Signal is JRandom POedDude in the case of terrorists. Very few JRandoms. Many fewer conspiracies because that takes 2 people who are unhinged to cooperate. Signal of those people’s meeting and joining is faint, whether the society is surveilled or not. A surveilled society doesn’t improve the signal so much as the noise. Their surveillance works against them. They know that, and do it for internal control, of course.
They know a lot more about ordinary citizens who are opposition, but none of us are a threat, yet. Leadership in these agencies is poor, which we know from the list of targets coming from their Fusion Centers. There is little real loyalty in those agencies. Their people must have very divided loyalties about patriots, III%. And so they are paranoid about Snowdons, which means more measures that increase their confidence little and annoy their own people.
**The first time some agencies SWAT team is ambushed and other agencies knew about the raid ahead of time, … the Fedgov agencies start distrusting each other a lot.